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This essay asks whether the global burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors (GBD) should be measured in terms
of their consequences for health, as maintained by most of those who are attempting to measure the GBD, or in
terms of their consequences for well-being, as argued by John Broome. It answers that the burden of disease
should be understood in terms of the consequences of disease for health, and it defends the wider efforts to
measure health by those who are in other ways skeptical of the project of measuring the GBD.
Keywords: Burden of disease, Well-being, Health measurementAn important project spearheaded by some of the World
Health Organization (WHO) staff in the 1990s was to
measure the global “burden of disease” – that is, the
contributions of diseases, injuries, and risk factors such
as tobacco smoking to ill health. This international effort
continues at several institutions and especially in the
work of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
(IHME). At the risk of implying more cohesiveness and
unity than is in fact the case, I shall refer to these
researchers as “the GBD team.” To measure the global
burden of disease, the GBD team has attempted to gen-
erate summary measures of overall population health
and to measure the health effects of diseases by means
of these summary measures. The GBD team hopes that
these summary measures will serve other purposes, such
as identifying locations where health is particularly bad,
assisting research, and guiding the allocation of health-
related resources ([1]), but this essay is concerned
mainly with the attempt to measure the global burden of
diseases, injuries, and risk factors.
In particular, this essay asks whether the global burden
of diseases, injuries, and risk factors should be under-
stood in terms of their consequences for health, as main-
tained by the GBD team, or in terms of their
consequences for well-being, as argued by John Broome
[2]. I answer that the burden of disease should be under-
stood in terms of the consequences of disease for health,Correspondence: dhausman@wisc.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orand I defend the wider efforts to measure health by
many others who are in other ways skeptical of detailed
features of the GBD team’s projects.
The view of the burden of disease shared by the GBD
team and by most others who have attempted to meas-
ure health starts with conceptualizing a person’s health
over a time period in terms of the sequence of their
health states. People’s health states are defined in turn
by their functional deficiencies (such as cognitive
problems, limitations to mobility or agility, sensory defi-
ciencies, or affective disorders), and by aspects of their
subjective states, such as pain and depression. Diseases,
injuries, and risk factors, like health interventions,
change the distribution of health states within a popula-
tion. This framework abstracts as far as possible from
the debates concerning the concept of health. It is com-
patible with the so-called “biostatistical view” defended
by Christopher Boorse ([3-6]) and the related views
defended by Jerome Wakefield ([7,8]). But is also com-
patible with many more evaluative views of health. (For
general discussions of the concept of health see [9] and
[10].) The burden of disease understood concretely is
the contrast between the distribution of health states
due to some disease or risk factor and a state of
complete health. Without a scalar measure of the change
in health states, there is however no unambiguous way
to compare the burdens of different causes of ill health.
So what is called the burden of disease is some scalar
measure of the departure from full health due to disease.. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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health measurement schemes such as the EQ-5D or the
Health Utilities Index (HUI), has hoped literally to meas-
ure the quantity of health. For example, Mathers et al.
[11], p. 324 write, “The health state valuations . . . repre-
sent quantifications of the overall health levels associated
with different states.” Salomon et al. [12], p. 307 write,
“[W]e consider a health state valuation to provide a sca-
lar cardinal index of the overall level of health associated
with a multidimensional health state.” (See also [13], p.
16, and [14], p. 431.) But it is impossible literally to
measure the quantity of health, because the relation
“healthier than” is incomplete. Health is multidimen-
sional, and the different dimensions are not commensur-
ate. The same is true of commodity bundles, and just as
there is no way to say whether one bundle of commod-
ities is larger than another (unless the first contains at
least as much of each commodity as the second), there
is no way to say whether one health state contains “more
health” than another ([15]). Though there is no way to
assign a measure to some putative quantity of health it-
self (just as there is no way to measure the size of a
commodity bundle), people can evaluate health states
(just as they can evaluate commodity bundles). By treat-
ing the values of health states as their measures – that
is, by measuring health states by how good they are –
health economists can calculate the values of distribu-
tions of health states. Health economists can then meas-
ure the effect of a disease on population health by
subtracting the value of the distribution of health states
that results from the disease from an estimate of the
value of what the distribution would be without disease.
John Broome argues that this way of determining the
global burden of disease is misconceived ([2]). He main-
tains that those concerned with the burden of disease
should attempt to measure the effects of diseases on
well-being rather than attempting to measure their
health effects. Although he directs his criticisms to the
GBD team, they apply broadly to efforts to measure
health, both welfarist and “extra-welfarist” ([16]).
Broome maintains that purported measurements of
health are really defective measures of well-being, and
his arguments imply that health cannot be measured at
all. Broome’s position is implicitly as critical of those
who attack the GBD team’s efforts, such as Alan
Williams ([17]), as of the GBD team’s project.
Broome makes two arguments against measuring the
burden of disease by its consequences for health. His
first argument relies on the premise that the value of
health is its contribution to well-being.
. . . the measure should measure health as a
component of well-being . . . . it is to measure how
good a person’s health is for the person, or how badher ill-health. . . . That is to say, it aims to measure
the contribution of health to well-being. ([2], p. 94)
The argument then concludes that the value of health
cannot be measured. Here is the argument: Health con-
tributes to well-being both causally and constitutively.
But the contribution that health makes to well-being is
not separable from the contribution of other factors.
Individuals in the same health state but different circum-
stances will often not be equally well off, and that differ-
ence cannot be factored into some common portion
contributed by health coupled with the separate contri-
bution of the circumstances. The contribution to well-
being of a token health state of a particular kind (that is,
the contribution to overall well-being of a specific per-
son being in that health state at a specific place and
time) differs depending on a person’s circumstances. A
health state of any specific kind makes no uniform con-
tribution to well-being.
Obviously, the way in which a person’s well-being is
affected by the various elements of her health
depends a great deal on other features of her life. For
example, asthma is less bad if you are well housed,
mental handicap less bad in supportive communities,
blindness less bad if you have access to the internet.
([2], p. 95)
So there can be no measure of the well-being pro-
duced by a kind of health state.
In fact, Broome’s critique is much more general.
Whether or not one focuses on well-being, the effects of
health states that determine their values depend on the
geographical, economic, technological, and cultural en-
vironment. In addition, the values of health states de-
pend on the tastes, values, and objectives of individuals
and on prevailing social values. Because health states
have different evaluatively relevant consequences in dif-
ferent contexts, token health states will have different
values, and health states of a given kind will have no
uniform value at all. Since the value of a kind or type of
health state is not defined, it cannot be measured. There
is no such thing as the value of a kind of health state. So
there is no way to measure the burden of disease by
measuring the value of the distribution of the kinds of
health states it causes. Health cannot be measured either
by its quantity or its value. Indeed, it cannot be mea-
sured at all!
Although not stating his negative argument this
broadly, Broome concludes that the burden of disease
should be measured by the change in well-being it
causes in the circumstances. If it is impossible to meas-
ure health, then one cannot measure the burden of dis-
ease by measuring health. If what matters is well-being
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should focus on the joint consequences for well-being of
health states and nonhealth factors.
Broome’s second argument against measuring the
burden of disease by its consequences for health is that
“we should be concerned with all of well-being” ([2],
p. 98) and hence with “the whole reduction in people’s
well-being, which is caused by disease” ([2], p. 97) not
with “only the part that consists in a reduction in
people’s health” ([2], p. 93). I take the “we” here to in-
clude those who make health policy. The implications
of this view extend far beyond efforts to carry out sum-
mary measures of population health. For example,
Broome’s view implies that the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence should determine what
treatments the National Health Service should provide
by examining their effectiveness at promoting well-
being, rather than by examining their effectiveness at
promoting health.
Broome maintains that health policy must be guided
by considerations of fairness as well as by concerns
about well-being. Saving the life of a poor patient or a
disabled patient may contribute less to aggregate well-
being than saving the life of someone richer or not dis-
abled, but that does not, in Broome’s view, justify treat-
ing the rich or nondisabled rather than the poor or
disabled, because doing so would be unfair ([2], p. 99).
Although Broome believes that fairness ultimately mat-
ters because of its contribution to the overall good ([2],
p. 100), he maintains that it is useful to separate con-
cerns about fairness from concerns about increasing
well-being. In Broome’s view one should measure the
burden of disease by the consequences for both well-
being and fairness. His focus in this critique is, however,
on well-being. So, Broome argues, the burden of disease
should be quantified by the impact of disease on well-
being, and the value of a token health state lies in its
bearing on well-being. Broome writes, for example,
Disease causes harms of a great many sorts, which are
often not themselves specifically changes in health.
For example, some diseases prevent their victims from
working, and so deprive them of income and the
other benefits that accompany work: companionship,
self-esteem and so on.
Indeed, the harms that are always treated as changes
in health often consist in deprivation of goods other
than health. . . .
So we ought not to be trying to measure the harm
done by disease in terms of health only, but in terms
of the whole of well-being. ([2], p. 98)
Up until the last sentence, the quotation seems cor-
rect, indeed obviously so – provided that one does notforget that the direct effects of disease are virtually en-
tirely effects on health and that the other harms that dis-
eases cause are the indirect effects of the changes in
health they cause. But the conclusion that those con-
cerned with health policy should be measuring the harm
done by disease “in terms of the whole of well-being”
does not follow without additional premises.
Health matters to people in many ways. For example,
certain health states damage or destroy people’s ability
to manage their own lives. In doing so, they typically
also diminish well-being, but one may reasonably ques-
tion whether the value of a loss of autonomy is captured
by the extent to which that loss of autonomy diminishes
well-being. Other health states interfere with people’s
abilities to pursue objectives that they value. The inabil-
ity to pursue those objectives will not necessarily dimin-
ish people’s well-being, because the objectives people
pursue are often irrelevant to their well-being and some-
times even detrimental to it. A young man who is too ill
to join the army to help resist an enemy invasion may be
better off for his illness, even if he is deeply committed
to sharing in the effort at defense. And even when lim-
itations on people’s ability to pursue their objectives di-
minish their well-being – as they typically do – the
significance of the limitation need not coincide with the
extent to which those limitations diminish well-being.
In practice, economists assign values to health states
by measuring people’s preferences among them. These
preferences do not always coincide with people’s judg-
ments of what would be best for themselves nor with
what would in fact be best for them ([18], chapters 7
and 8). In fact, the problematic actual methods of
assigning values to the consequences of disease by meas-
uring preferences neither focus exclusively on the conse-
quences of disease for well-being nor on the consequences
of disease specifically for health.
It might be argued that even though the bearing of
health states on well-being does not exhaust the ways in
which health states matter to individuals, only their
bearing on well-being should influence social policy. If
the sole ultimate goal of social policy were to enhance
welfare (within the limits of fairness), then it would seem
that the relevant burden of disease consists of the conse-
quences of disease for well-being.
Many would reject the view of social policy as aimed
ultimately at promoting welfare. Libertarians argue that
the ultimate aim of social policy is to enhance individual
freedom, and that people’s well-being is their own
responsibility, not at all a social concern. Most liberals
concede that one aim of social policy is to promote wel-
fare, but insist that policies have other independent
aims, including protecting freedom and expanding op-
portunities. Since health influences opportunity and peo-
ple’s ability to make use of their freedom, liberals should
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on well-being.
Even if one held that the ultimate aim of social policy
is to promote well-being within the constraints of fair-
ness, it does not follow that the burden of disease should
be measured by the impact of disease on well-being. To
enhance well-being within the constraints of fairness,
policymakers need information about the consequences
of alternative policies. Information about the magnitudes
of problems and the consequences of policies may be
useful even if it does not specify how those conse-
quences bear on individual well-being. Simply knowing
how many people die every year of malaria and at what
ages tells policymakers that malaria is a very serious
problem even though this information makes no explicit
claims about well-being. From the premise that policy-
makers need to know the consequences of alternative
health policies for well-being, it does not follow that
health should be measured in terms of well-being. All
that follows is that policymakers be able to draw infer-
ences concerning well-being from measures of health.
Furthermore, regardless of the ultimate aims, social
policy has many interim aims, and with respect to the
interim aims, measures of health states in terms of their
impact on overall well-being or fairness may be inferior
to other health state measures. Suppose, for example,
that a government is attempting to diminish poverty and
that it wants information about the health of members
of social groups both to diagnose how serious the pov-
erty of different groups may be (since poverty affects
health) and because it is considering undertaking public
health measures as a way of addressing poverty (since
health affects poverty). Information concerning the well-
being of social groups is not what is needed, nor is infor-
mation about the effects on overall well-being of the
contemplated public health initiatives. In measuring
health, health analysts are generating data that will be
used for many purposes, and Broome has provided no
argument for the claim that information concerning the
impact of health states for well-being will serve these
purposes better than other sorts of information.
Whether or not one holds that the sole ultimate aim of
social policy is to boost individual welfare fairly, there is
little to be said for the claim that health is valuable only
insofar as it is part of or a cause of welfare or that the
burden of disease should be quantified by the conse-
quences of disease for well-being in the circumstances.
Moreover, there are strong reasons not to measure the
burden of disease by its consequences for well-being.
Broome's measure of health conflicts with most people's
judgments concerning the severity of diseases and health
states, and it would imply policies that most people
would reject. Consider a disability such as paraplegia, to
which many people successfully adapt. As people adapt,their well-being improves, but their physical health
remains much the same. If one measures the severity of
a health state by its consequences for an individual's
well-being, then one either has to deny that paraplegia is
a significant disability for those who successfully adapt,
or one has to maintain, falsely, that people who have
such disabilities cannot live excellent lives. If one rejects
the second alternative, as one must, then health policy
devoted to preventing or curing paraplegia has to be
defended mainly in terms of the well-being costs of
adapting to inability to walk, the costs to others of
accommodations for the disabled, or the diminished
contribution those with these disabilities may make to
the well-being of others. Rather than jumping through
these hoops, one should recognize that paraplegia is a
significant disability regardless of the extent to which it
may diminish well-being.
Broome does not maintain that his measure of the
burden of disease matches our intuitive judgments con-
cerning the severity of diseases and health states, and he
could maintain that popular opinion about the signifi-
cance of common disabilities is mistaken. If he had a
well-supported theory and our pretheoretic views about
the significance of disease had no rationale, then the
conflict of Broome’s views with popular judgment would
not be a very serious criticism. But, on the one hand, the
common view that health states such as blindness, deaf-
ness, and paraplegia are significant disabilities can be
explained and rationalized by pointing to the effects of
health on things other than well-being, such as oppor-
tunity, and, on the other hand, as I argued above,
Broome's view is not well-supported.
The conflict between Broome's measure of the burden
of disease and people’s judgments concerning health is
stark. If one were to measure the burden of disease in
the way that Broome defends, two countries that have
exactly the same distribution of health states and whose
health distribution is changed in exactly the same way
by a disease would nevertheless be burdened differently
by the disease, whenever its effects on well-being were
not the same in both countries. By assumption, if the
health states are the same, the health effects of the dis-
ease are the same, yet the burden of disease is not the
same. For those who want to measure the consequences
for health, this result is intolerable. On Broome’s view,
in contrast, this result is unsurprising. Broome is, after
all, denying that the burden of disease should be calcu-
lated in terms of the consequences for population health.
So what if the effects of disease on health are just the
same? The burden of disease as Broome understands it
– that is, the consequences of disease for well-being – is
not the same.
It is hard to accept this view of the burden of disease,
because people are concerned specifically about health.
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Broome’s way is greater in one country than another
would tell us that the effects of the disease are worse,
but it would not tell us that there was a greater health
problem or that more resources that are earmarked to
address health problems should go to one country rather
than the other. A measure of the burden of disease in
terms of the consequences for well-being may fail to tell
those who are concerned about health what they want
to know.
There are also practical problems with Broome’s pro-
posal to measure the burden of disease by the effects of
disease on well-being. Though it is hard to assign a sca-
lar measure to health and hence to measure the health
effects of disease, it seems to be harder still to assign a
scalar measure to well-being. What constitutes a per-
son’s good is at least as multidimensional as what consti-
tutes their health. There are methods of quantifying
preferences, but preference satisfaction does not coincide
with welfare. Furthermore, whereas there are clear con-
straints on interpersonal health comparisons, since peo-
ple’s health is the same when they are in the same health
state, it is far from clear how to make interpersonal
comparisons of preferences or well-being. If it is not
possible to measure well-being on at least an interval
scale and, in addition, to make interpersonal compari-
sons of well-being, then it is not possible to aggregate
individual well-being or to compare changes in well-
being across populations. So it would be impossible to
estimate the effect of disease on overall well-being. Even
if there were good reason to implement Broome’s pro-
posal, it would be very difficult to do so.
Moreover, possessing an interpersonally comparable
interval-scale measure of overall well-being would not
by itself get one far, because health economists are in no
position to estimate the consequences of diseases, injur-
ies, and risk factors or of health policies on overall well-
being. To estimate consequences of a disease or a policy
on well-being requires that one compare what well-
being would be in the future with or without the disease
or the policy. To make such a comparison demands
much more than knowledge of the direct effects of dis-
eases or health policies on health states. In addition, one
needs estimates of economic growth, technological pro-
gress, climate change, educational achievement, political
stability, and so forth. One cannot expect health econo-
mists to have this knowledge. Though one might reason-
ably expect them to be able to estimate the effects of
diseases or policies on the distribution of health states,
one cannot reasonably expect them to be able to esti-
mate the effects of diseases or policies on well-being.
Insofar as policymakers aim to enhance well-being,
they need to be able to estimate the well-being conse-
quences of social policies. What they can reasonablyexpect from health economists are data from which they
(the policymakers) can draw inferences concerning what
the consequences for well-being will be of diseases or
health policies when they are coupled with education
policies, agricultural policies, transportation policies, and
so forth. They cannot expect health economists to tell
them what the consequences for well-being would be.
Instead of defining the mission of the various state
sectors (health, education, occupational health and
safety, environmental policy, and so forth) to be to pro-
mote well-being by manipulating the particular causal
factors within the purview of the particular state agency
– which seems to be Broome's view ([2], p. 98) – con-
temporary governments assign different goals to differ-
ent sectors. They do this because there is no feasible
alternative, even if everyone accepted Broome's view that
the ultimate goals of policy are well-being and fairness.
Of course current practices result in many misdirected
efforts and mistaken policies. Coordination among vari-
ous agencies is needed. But the department of health
cannot be feasibly charged with the promotion of well-
being by influencing health, while the department of
education aims to promote welfare by influencing educa-
tion, and the department of transportation aims to pro-
mote welfare by building roads, transit systems, and
airports. Those working in specific departments do not
know how to enhance overall well-being, and their
clumsy efforts to do so would inevitably collide. The
goals of those concerned with health policy are nar-
rower, and the information they need concerns more im-
mediate consequences of policy or disease.
Although these considerations cast doubt on Broome’s
claim that the burden of disease should be identified
with the consequences of disease for well-being, they
leave his critique of health measures intact. Indeed, if
anything, they magnify the difficulties. The difficulties
facing those who attempt to measure health do not de-
pend on Broome’s assumption that the value of health
consists in its bearing on well-being. To measure health
and hence to provide a scalar measure of the conse-
quences of disease for health requires that one assign
values to kinds of health states, as defined by some
health state classification system. But the consequences
of tokens of the same health state type and hence the
values of the tokens differ depending on the context.
Health states types do not have values. How then is it
possible to measure health?
This appears to be a very serious problem. How can a
health economist assign a single number to many differ-
ent values? As difficult as it may be to provide a scalar
measure of the consequences of disease for well-being in
a specific context, it is harder still to provide an overall
measure of the various intrinsic and instrumental values
of health states across a whole range of contexts.
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the problem as baldly and explicitly as I have, they have
proposed two possible solutions. One possibility is to
take the value of a health state of a particular type to be
the average over all the different contexts of the values
of its tokens, where this average is weighted by the
frequency of the contexts ([19], p. 34). More formally,
let V(h) be the value (the quality adjustment) of a health
state of type h and let vi(h) be the value of tokens of h
that occur in context i. vi(h) would depend on the intrin-
sic value of h in the i’th context and on the value of the
consequences of h in that context, which could include
the consequences of h for well-being. One could then
specify V(h) =
P
fivi(h) where fi is the frequency of the
i’th context. There is, however, no feasible way of elicit-
ing all the many context-dependent values of health
states and then averaging them. Average health state
values might instead be inferred from preferences among
health states – though such an inference would be pre-
carious and would place heavy demands on the methods
employed to elicit those preferences. Although the global
weighted average of the values of the tokens will often
differ from both the value of any specific token and from
the average value health states have in individual coun-
tries or regions, relying on these global average values is
arguably a reasonable way to quantify the global health
effects of diseases, injuries, and risk factors.
The second way of coping with the problem that
tokens of the same health state have differing values is
to take the value of a health state to depend upon the
value of its consequences in some specified “standard”
context ([12], p. 304). Provided that the choice of a
standard context can be justified, one can also use the
standard values of health states to assign a value to the
effects of diseases, injuries, and risk factors on the distri-
bution of health states. Whether average or standardized
values of health states will serve the other purposes that
a summary measure of population health was designed
to serve is another question, which I have addressed in
another essay ([15]). But if the distribution of contexts is
held constant (as it must be in order to implement
Broome’s own proposal that one calculate the effects of
diseases on well-being), then the effects of diseases on
the value of population health can be calculated from
their effects on the distribution of health states and the
average or standard values of health states.
Conclusions
Many problems remain, and different measures may be
needed for different purposes. Yet the prospects for
assessing the burden of disease in terms of the conse-
quences of disease, injuries, and risk factors for health it-
self are not so bleak as they may have appeared earlier
in this essay. Evaluating health states by the weightedaverage of the values of their tokens or by the value they
have in a standard context is a compromise that grows
out of the impossibility of quantifying health itself. But it
is a compromise worth making, because (in contrast to
Broome’s proposal) some measure of health itself is
needed for policy purposes.
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